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In recent papers, Zurek (2005) has objected to the decision-theoretic approach of 
(Deutsch, 1999) and (Wallace, 2003) to deriving the Born rule for quantum probabilities 
on the grounds that it courts circularity. Deutsch and Wallace assume that the many 
worlds theory is true and that decoherence gives rise to a preferred basis. However, 
decoherence arguments use the reduced density matrix, which relies upon the partial trace 
and hence upon the Born Rule for its validity. Using the Heisenberg Picture and quantum 
Darwinism – the notion that classical information is quantum information that can 
proliferate in the environment pioneered in (Olliver et al. 2005 and 2006) – I show that 
measurement interactions between two systems only create correlations between a 
specific set of commuting observables of system 1 and a specific set of commuting 
observables of system 2. This argument picks out a unique basis in which information 
flows in the correlations between those sets of commuting observables. I then derive the 
Born rule for both pure and mixed states and answer some other criticisms of the decision 
theoretic approach to quantum probability. 
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The basic equations of quantum mechanics are uncontroversial, but the explanation 
(interpretation) of these equations is still very controversial. According to the many 
worlds interpretation quantum physics should be taken literally – in particular when its 
equations say that physical objects exist in multiple versions this should be taken to mean 
that these other versions do actually exist (Everett, 1957; Deutsch, 1997 and 2002). One 
of the problems with this view is that one cannot experiment directly on these other 
versions of objects, but can only do so indirectly through interference. If the many worlds 
theory is true, that must presumably be because physical reality (in this context called the 
multiverse) is divided approximately into separate layers, each of which resembles the 
world of classical physics to some extent, for some demonstrable reason. One approach 
to securing this conclusion has been decoherence: every system interacts with an 
environment to some extent, and the hope was that by tracing the environmental degrees 
of freedom out of the density matrix of a system it could be shown that open quantum 
systems have a ‘pointer basis’ in which they act classically to a suitable degree of 
approximation. Calculations and computer simulations of decoherence seemed to indicate 
that there is a pointer basis for many interesting systems (Zurek, 1991). However, as 
Zurek (2005) pointed out, decoherence arguments assume that the partial trace procedure 
for extracting reduced density matrices is valid and this in turn assumes that the Born rule 
is valid (Neilsen and Chuang, 2000, p. 107; Landau, 1927). The Born Rule states that for 
a quantum observable Aˆ  of a system in a state ρ  the expectation value of Aˆ  is given by: 
 Aˆ = Tr ρAˆ( ) (1) 
where Tr is the trace function. 
 
 
Another problem is that quantum systems do not obey the axioms of standard probability 
theory (see e.g. (Deutsch, Ekert and Luppachini, 2000) – for instance, there is no way of 
assigning probabilities obeying the chain rule, to values of observables at times when 
they are not ‘observed’). Hence, the Born rule for obtaining probabilities from quantum 
systems is not generally applicable while interference processes are under way. So the 
question arises: under what circumstances do quantum systems obey the Born rule? There 
have been many unsuccessful approaches to this problem using the frequency 
interpretation of probability, which is unviable because it relies on the unphysical notion 
of an infinite set of measurements. More recently there have been some approaches to 
probability via decision theory (Deutsch, 1999; DeWitt, 1998; Wallace, 2003). Decision 
theory describes the behaviour of agents or decision makers who assign ‘values’ to 
different games in a way that satisfies the ‘rationality’ requirement, namely that for any 
two games G1 and G2  either the value of G1 is greater than that of G2 , or it is less than 
that of G2  or it is equal in value to G2 . If the value of G1 is greater than that of G2 , the 
agent will willingly give up an opportunity to experience G2  for an opportunity to 
experience G1 and if the ranking is reversed his preferences will reverse too. If their value 
is equal he will be indifferent between experiencing G1 and experiencing G2 . If, as in 
quantum physics, a game has many possible outcomes then he will assign probabilities to 
the different possible outcomes to assign the game a value. It may be thought that 
decision theory is irrelevant to the laws of physics. However this objection is wrong 
because any real agent must be a physical system. In particular, if the laws of physics 
allow the existence of agents who act in the manner described above, then decision 
theory is applicable to physics; otherwise decision theory is not applicable to physics. If 
decision theory is applicable to physics then in some sense the laws of rationality are 
laws of physics because they predict the behaviour of a certain physical systems – 
decision theoretic agents. This argument also answers the objection that the laws of 
physics, including the Born rule should underwrite decision theory and not the other way 
around. Previous quantum mechanical decision theoretic arguments assumed that 
decoherence selects a preferred basis that evolves classically to a good approximation and 
so that information could only propagate in this preferred basis. As agents have to be able 
to receive information and use it to change their environment – perhaps by placing bets – 
they could only care about a set of outcomes in the preferred basis. In this approach, it 
was argued that quantum physics in the Schrödinger Picture (with static observables and 
an evolving global state) is compatible with decision theory in the sense that under 
suitable circumstances the Born rule (and, indeed, only it) satisfies the rationality 
requirement and the axioms of probability theory in the Everett interpretation. 
 
Zurek (2005) argues that the decision theoretic approach courts circularity because the 
decision-theoretic arguments proposed to date take for granted that decoherence provides 
a preferred ‘pointer basis’ and this relies on the partial trace which relies on the Born rule 
(Neilsen and Chuang, 2000, p.107; Landau, 1927). Zurek then derives the probability rule 
using either decision theory or the relative frequency approach, using certain invariance 
properties of Schrödinger states of systems that have been measured. He calls this 
approach envariance.  
 
By contrast with Deutsch and Wallace, I will not assume that decoherence gives rise to a 
preferred basis. Instead I show that a measurement interaction between two systems only 
create correlations between observable Aˆ1 t( ) of a system S1 and observable Aˆ2 t( )  of 
another system S2 . This picks out a unique basis in which information flows in the 
correlations between observables of these quantum systems. The properties of these 
measurement interactions place substantial restrictions on the information that can 
propagate in the environment and so on the information that an agent can get about a 
system and I use these restrictions to derive the Born rule by treating decision theoretic 
agents as information-processing systems. (Ollivier et al., 2004 and 2005) have also 
discussed the constraints on what sort of information about a quantum system can spread 
widely in the environment. Unlike Ollivier et al., I use the Heisenberg Picture because 
the Schrödinger picture (with its global but evolving state) is not as useful for the study of 
information propagation as is the Heisenberg Picture (with its static state and local 
evolving observables), as Deutsch and Hayden (2000) have pointed out. Of course, it is 
possible to trace the flow of information in the Schrödinger Picture as it is 
mathematically equivalent to the Heisenberg Picture, and it has been used to prove results 
about the flow of information in quantum systems in (Tipler, 2000; Page, 1982), so these 
results could be derived in the Schrödinger Picture, but the argument would be more 
difficult to follow. Ollivier et al. also discuss quantitative issues of how to decide how 
much information flows out of a system into the environment. In this paper I discuss only 
qualitative issues of quantum Darwinism that have a bearing on quantum decision theory. 
In Section 2 I derive the relevant part of quantum Darwinism using the Heisenberg 
Picture. In Section 3 I use the results of Section 2 together with decision theory to derive 
the Born rule. In Section 4 I discuss the result and some criticisms of the decision 
theoretic approach.  
 
 
2. Quantum Darwinism in the Heisenberg picture 
 
First I shall explain the formalism that I will use to obtain the results in this paper. In the 
Heisenberg Picture, an arbitrary observable Aˆ1 t( ) of a system S1 with an N -dimensional 
Hilbert space is a Hermitian operator which can be written as 
ˆ A 1 t( )= α1a ˆ B 1A a t( )
a= 0
N−1∑ ,                                                                                                         (2) 
where the α1a  are static, real c-numbers and the ˆ B 1A a t( ) are Hermitian operators such that 
Bˆ1 A a t( )Bˆ1A b t( )= δa b Bˆ1A a t( )
Bˆ1A a t( )= 1ˆ
a=0
N −1∑  ,                                                                                           (3) 
where ˆ 1 is the unit observable. Thus the ˆ B 1A a t( ) are a set of commuting projectors. (I 
have used this notation to avoid confusion between projectors and payoff functions, see 
Section 3.) I shall discuss he role of the static Heisenberg state below. Observables of S1 
that do not commute with Aˆ1 t( ) have different sets of projectors from Aˆ1 t( ), but the 
equation for those observables in terms of those different projectors has the same form of 
as equation (2). 
 
So the ˆ B 1A a t( ) do not span the full vector space of the observables of S1 so some more 
operators are needed. The operators S1A a b t( ) are defined to have the properties 
S1A a b t( )S1A c d t( )= δb cS1A a d t( )
S1A a a t( )= ˆ B 1A a t( )
.                                                                                          (4) 
In other words, these operators have the same algebra as matrices with a 1 in the a,b( )th 
slot and 0 elsewhere. The S1A a b t( ) are a full basis of the vector space of the observables 
of S1. (However, the S1A a b t( ) are not all observables since they are not all Hermitian.) An 
arbitrary observable ˆ C 1 t( ) of S1 that is not equal to Aˆ1 t( ) may be written as 
ˆ C 1 t( )= γ1c ˆ B 1C c t( )
c= 0
N−1∑
ˆ B 1C c t( )= β1c d eS1A d e t( )
c= 0
N−1∑
 ,                                                                                                (5) 
where the γ1c  are real, static c-numbers (the eigenvalues of ˆ C 1 t( )) and the β1c d e  are 
complex static c-numbers such that the projectors ˆ B 1C c t( ) obey the algebra (3). 
 
An arbitrary observable ˆ A 1 t( ) evolves as 





,                                                                                                           (6) 
where Ut
†  is the Hermitian conjugate of Ut . Ut  may or may not depend only on 
descriptors of S1. The S1A a b t( ) are linear combinations of observables and so they also 
evolve according to this rule. I will suppose for the rest of this paper, with no relevant 
loss of generality, that the systems investigated evolve in steps of unit duration and the 
observables will be considered only at the end of each step. The generality follows from 
the fact that a quantum computational network evolving in the manner described may 
simulate any transformation undergone by any finite quantum system with arbitrary 
accuracy (Deutsch, 1989). Nothing would be lost by discarding this assumption, except 
for some clarity. A computer is a physical system composed of subsystems S1,S2 ...  with 
associated observable quantities that can take on some discrete range of values. The 
computer evolves in discrete steps during which only some finite number of subsystems 
interact with one another. The motion undergone by the computer is called a 
computation. 
 
I shall now explain in what sense a quantum system can perform a classical computation 
– that is, a computation that could be performed by a Turing Machine obeying classical 
physics as defined by Turing (1936) – and how information propagates between quantum 
systems. Consider a specific example of motion of a quantum system: 
U = exp iφb( )S1A b π b( ) 0( )
b= 0
N−1∑ ,                                                                                                (7) 
where π  is a permutation of the integers 0...N −1 and the φb  are arbitrary real numbers. 
Then 
ˆ A 1 1( )= α1a ˆ B 1A π a( ) 0( )
a= 0
N−1∑ ,                                                                                                     (8) 
so this motion has just permuted the eigenvalues corresponding to each of the projectors 
associated with ˆ A 1 t( ) and the phases φb  don’t matter so far as the evolution of this 
observable under U  is concerned. 
 
However, U  has a very different effect on the ˆ B 1C c t( ) (and hence on the arbitary 
observable ˆ C 1 t( ) provided it does not commute with ˆ A 1 t( )): 
ˆ B 1C c 1( )= exp i φd − φe( )[ ]β1c d eS1A π d( )π e( ) 0( )
c= 0
N−1∑ .                                                                  (9) 
The phases φb  do matter to ˆ C 1 t( ) and this evolution does not permute the ˆ B 1C c t( ). 
 
Since the evolution of ˆ A 1 t( ) under U  values permutes projectors that can be labelled with 
the integers from 0 to N − 1 and any algorithm that permutes integers from 0 to N − 1 
could be performed by a Turing machine obeying classical physics, the evolution of ˆ A 1 t( ) 
under U  performs N  classical computations evaluating the same function of the integers 
from 0 to N − 1 with different initial values. Each of these is locally and possibly 
globally a branch of the multiverse – that is to say, a structure within which information 
flows perfectly about values of observables ˆ A 1 t( ) at an earlier time. (See (Deutsch, 2002) 
for an elaboration of this argument.) A branch of the multiverse must be a structure 
within which information flows because one of the characteristic features of the 
macroscopic world is that information does flow in the sense that it is possible to infer 
some features of the past from records and to predict some features of the future from the 
present state of the world. Furthermore as I show below information flows perfectly 
between systems only in branches characterised by classical computation. The evolution 
of ˆ C 1 t( ) under U  does not perform a classical computation and does not constitute a 
branch of the multiverse. As I will discuss below a system may branch in different ways 
at different times so a branch may not survive for very long. If a branch continues to exist 
on large ‘classical’ scales I will call it a ‘world’. 
 
In the many worlds theory, a measurement of a quantum system produces correlations 
between observables of the measured system and the measuring system and does not 
select one possible value of that observable as “the value” of that observable. 
Nevertheless, observers and measuring instruments do not observe all of the possible 
values of an observable. 
 
The standard proof that, in the many worlds interpretation, observers and measuring 
instruments do not observe all of the possible values of an observable runs as follows. Let 
S1 and S2  be two systems with N -dimensional Hilbert spaces H1 and H2  respectively 
with the joint system S1S2 having Hilbert space H1 ⊗ H2. Consider the observables ˆ A 1 t( ) 
and ˆ A 2 t( ) of S1 and S2  respectively 
ˆ A 1 t( )= α1a ˆ B 1A a t( )
a= 0
N −1∑
ˆ A 2 t( )= α2 b ˆ B 2 A b t( )
b= 0
N −1∑
,                                                                                                     (10) 
where these two observables have identical spectra. And let 
ˆ C 1 t( )= γ1c ˆ B 1C c t( )
c= 0
N−1∑
ˆ B 1C c t( )= β1c d eS1A d e t( )
d ,e= 0
N−1∑
ˆ C 2 t( )= γ 2 c ˆ B 2C c t( )
c= 0
N−1∑
ˆ B 2C c t( )= β1c d eS1A d e t( )
d ,e= 0
N−1∑
,                                                                                             (11) 
 where the observables ˆ C 1 t( ) and ˆ C 2 t( )  have the same spectra as the observables ˆ A 1 t( ) 
and ˆ A 2 t( ) but do not commute with ˆ A 1 t( ) and ˆ A 2 t( ). 
 
Consider the motion described by 
UM 1 = exp iφa b( )ˆ B 1A a 0( )S2 A b a ⊕N b 0( )
a,b= 0
N−1∑ ,                                                                         (12) 
where 
a ⊕N b ≡ a + b( )mod N .                                                                                                  (13) 
Then 
ˆ A 1 1( )= α1a ˆ B 1A a 0( )=
a= 0
N−1∑ ˆ A 1 0( )
ˆ A 2 1( )= α2 b ˆ B 1A a 0( ) ˆ B 2 A a ⊕N b 0( )
a,b= 0
N−1∑
.                                                                                   (14) 
So ˆ A 1 t( ) is unaffected but ˆ A 2 t( ) now depends on the values of a  and b and so this is 
called a perfect measurement of ˆ A 1 t( ) by ˆ A 2 t( ) as it perfectly correlates ˆ A 2 t( ) with 
ˆ A 1 t( ). Furthermore, (12) performs a classical computation on ˆ A 1 t( ) and ˆ A 2 t( ) in the 
sense described above. As such there are N  independent branches and in each version the 
measuring instrument measures only one version of the measured system.  
 However, ˆ C 1 t( ) and ˆ C 2 t( ) respond very differently: 
ˆ C 1 1( )= exp i φd b − φa b( )[ ]γ1cβ1c a d S1A a d 0( )
a,b,c,d = 0
N−1∑ S2 A a ⊕N b d ⊕N b 0( )
ˆ C 2 1( )= exp i φa d − φa b( )[ ]γ 2 cβ2 c b d ˆ B 1A a 0( )S2 A a ⊕N b a ⊕N d 0( )
a,b,c,d = 0
N−1∑
.                                       (15) 
 
ˆ C 1 t( ) and ˆ C 2 t( ) are not perfectly correlated with one another or with anything else and 
do not evolve classically under (12). Thus (12) perfectly correlates ˆ A 1 t( ) and ˆ A 2 t( ), but 
not ˆ C 1 t( ) and ˆ C 2 t( ). Hence the form of the measurement interaction selects a preferred 
pointer basis: it induces the existence of branches down which information flows 
characterised by different values of ˆ A 1 t( ), but not of ˆ C 1 t( ). Furthermore, (14)  and (15)
illustrate that measurement can only copy information about eigenvalues of commuting 
sets of observables. Since information does get copied from one system to another (e.g. – 
from the document I am writing to other identical copies of this document that other 
people will read) and measurements of the kind described above are classical 
computations on ˆ A 1 t( ) and ˆ A 2 t( ) branches must be characterised by classical evolution. 
 
What happens if ˆ C 1 t( ), which isn’t correlated with anything is measured onto ˆ A 2 t( )? 
First, between times 1 and 2, S1 evolves so that 
ˆ A 1 2( )= ˆ C 1 1( ).                                                                                                                   (16) 
If the measurement  
UM 2 = exp iφab( )Bˆa1 2( )S2 Aba⊕N b 2( )
a,b=0
N −1∑                                                                           (17) 
is then performed the result is 
ˆ A 2 3( ) = α2 b ˆ B 1A a 2( )
a,b= 0
N−1∑ ˆ B 2 A a ⊕N b 2( )
= α2 bβ1a e a ⊕N b exp i φa ⊕N b d − φc d( )[ ]S1A e a ⊕N b 0( )S2 A e ⊕N d a ⊕N b ⊕N c 0( )
a,b,c,d ,e= 0
N−1∑
.               (18) 
This is effectively a measurement of ˆ C 1 t( ) onto ˆ A 2 t( ). From (18) it can be seen that the 
observable still has a branching structure in a suitably chosen basis but each branch that 
existed at time 0 is not associated with a single branch at time 2 but instead with multiple 
branches. As such not all the classical information that was recorded in ˆ A 2 t( ) before the 
measurement has been retained. 
 
So if measurements are always made in the same basis then the measured observable and 
the measuring observable may be regarded as a perfect channel for information about the 
results of classical computations. Otherwise it may not. And that is the main point of 
quantum Darwinism. Even here, however, the observables will carry N  versions of this 
information as all classical evolution changes all N  versions of a particular system. 
Quantum Darwinism in the sense used here is somewhat stricter than the sense in which 
the term is used in (Ollivier et al., 2004 and 2005). I discuss the issue of the relationship 
between the two ideas in Section 4. 
 
A system that processes classical information – such as the human brain, or a decision 
theoretic agent – only does so in some of its observables. Thus, a classical computation, 
such as human thought, must be instantiated only on some of the observables describing 
the physical object performing the computation. Even a quantum computer can only 
contain an answer to a problem in some commuting set of observables if that answer is to 
be propagated and used. And in general since the classically evolving observable is doing 
many classical computations an observer can experience only one of these computations, 
the particular computation that instantiates him, and so each copy of the observer can 
observe only one of the possible values of an observable after a measurement. The 
constant Heisenberg relative state ρ , a positive operator with trace 1, contains 
information about what observables carry information and what their values are in the 
world under consideration. This information is necessary for making predictions. In this 
sense, the state is an emergent feature of information flow between observables in 
quantum systems. The existence of the state is a consequence of measurement theory in 
the many worlds theory and is not needed to derive measurement theory. So quantum 
Darwinism is more fundamental than envariance, which relies on the existence of the 
relative state. The information that can be accessed in the state ρ  by an observer about an 
observable ˆ A 1 t( ) is contained in ρ ˆ A 1 t( ). And since measurement has the form of classical 
evolution in the sense described above an observer cannot access any phase information 
in ρ ˆ A 1 t( ). When some observable has a definite value in the world under consideration 
the state is said to be pure. A pure state obeys the equation ρ2 = ρ  and so the state is equal 
to the product of projectors for some set of observables at equal times for all of the 
subsystems of the system of interest. For a pure state there is an observable ˆ A 1 t( ) of the 
whole system for which 
ρ ˆ A 1 t( )= α1aρ ,                                                                                                                  (19) 
In all of the worlds in the region of the multiverse described by the state ρ  the observable 
ˆ A 1 t( ) has value α1a . If there is no such observable then the state is said to be mixed.  
 
I will need one more form of measurement to provide a proof of the Born rule. 
Sometimes an observable on an N -dimensional Hilbert space H1 may be measured onto 
an observable of an M -dimensional Hilbert space H1 with M > N . To do this H2  is 
divided into a subspaces H2 a  of dimension ma  so that 
H2 = ⊗a= 0
N−1 H2 a .                                                                                                                 (20) 
The observables ˆ A 1 t( ) and ˆ A 2 t( ) with spectra α1a  and α2 b  with a = 0...N −1, b = 0...M −1 
respectively then evolve such that 
ˆ A 1 t +1( )= α1a ˆ B 1A a t( )
a= 0
N−1∑
ˆ A 2 t +1( )= ˆ B 1A a t( ) α2 b ˆ B 2 A b t( )
b=γ a−1






γ j = mk
k= 0
j∑
.                                                                            (21) 
This measurement differs from the ones above only in that for every possible value α1a  
many possible values of the measuring observable act as indicators of that value of ˆ A 1 t( ). 
This kind of measurement gives the same information as the earlier simpler 
measurements like (17) and (12). 
 
3. Decision theory and quantum probability 
 
Decision theory concerns rational agents, that is, physical objects such as persons that 
rank different physical states of affairs on a single scale of value. These agents may be 
considered as playing games in which each possible consequence of a particular action 
has some payoff associated with it. The value of a game is the payoff such that the agent 
is neutral between receiving that payoff and playing the game. In the context of quantum 
theory an agent is an information-processing system that obeys quantum physics and a 
physical state of affairs consists of an observable to be measured and a state in which it 
will be measured. By using this approach do I presuppose the Born rule? Unitary 
evolution does not presuppose the Born rule and indeed some unitary evolution changes 
amplitudes in ways that violate the Born rule as mentioned in Section 1. The 
measurement theory of Section 2 is about the creation of perfect correlations between 
observables and so explains what information an agent can extract from a system. In 
Section 2 I made no reference to probability and did not use the Born rule. 
 
More explicitly, a quantum game consists of (1) an observable to be measured ˆ A 1 t( ), the 
measurement results being the consequences of the agent’s decision to play that particular 
game, (2) a state ρ  in which ˆ A 1 t( ) is measured, (3) a payoff function P  that gives 
information on how much the agent gets for each eigenvalue of ˆ A 1 t( ) that is observed 
(i.e. – it is a function from the eigenvalues of ˆ A 1 t( ) to the real numbers) and (4) a value 
function V  which maps ˆ A 1 t( ), the state ρ  and the payoff function P  to a real number 
that is the value of the game.  
 
In addition there is a set of acts that may be performed upon the system S1 that has 
observable ˆ A 1 t( ) and ancillary systems to change one game into another – unitary 
operations. 
 
I should briefly discuss assumption (3) because some physicists apparently regard it as 
problematic. For an example see (Barnum et al., 2000, Section III) in which they 
complain that Deutsch assumes that when the eigenvalues are the same in each branch the 
player always gets the same payoff. As noted above when one observable is measured 
onto another, the measurement only conveys information about that observable and those 
observables of the measured system with which it commutes. Moreover, in each branch 
only information about the specific value that has been measured in that branch is 
available and can affect what happens in that branch. So attempts to argue that payoffs 
should not be associated with eigenvalues of the measured observable are perverse.  
 
The result that I will derive is  
V ρ, Aˆ1 t( ), P0( )= Tr ρAˆ1 t( )( ),                                                                                          (22) 
where P0  is the payoff function that gives payoffs equal to the eigenvalues of ˆ A 1 t( ) in 
each branch. That is, the expectation value Tr ρAˆ1 t( )( ) predicted by the Born Rule will 
be shown to be the same as the value of the game in state ρ , observable ˆ A 1 t( ) and payoff 
function P0 . So any quantum measurement may be interpreted as a quantum game with 
specific payoffs and expectation values. 
 
If a particular game is changed in any of the attributes listed (1) – (3) then it becomes a 
different game. If two games have the same value they may be said to be equivalent 
because the agent is indifferent between playing them. The following properties of the 
value function follow from the general description of a game above and the discussion of 
Section 2: 
 
An agent must be able to retain information about the value of an observable he has 
experienced if he is to keep the payoff associated with that value. Otherwise he will 
forget the value and the associated payoff. So he must get the payoff by measuring 
commuting observables and keeping the records in observables that commute with the 
observables that will be measured by other systems. And as each memory record within 
the agent may be measured by other observables that constitute the agent, all the 
observables in which the records are kept must commute with one another. This means 
that the agent cannot care about phases in the product ρ ˆ A 1 t( ) that provides him with all 
the information he can access about ˆ A 1 t( ). This property of rational agents is called 
phase indifference. 
 
If an act U  is a classical computation relative to the observable ˆ A 1 t( ) to be measured and 
U †ρU = UρU † = ρ  then U  does not change the game’s value and I will call U  a 
classical act. U  just permutes which of the possible values of the observable are 
associated with which branch with respect to the observable concerned and with respect 
to the state picking out the world in which the game takes place. That is, the agent cares 
about the consequences associated with being in a branch, not how the branches happen 
to be labelled. This principle is called classical act neutrality. 
 
Physicality If there are two observables ˆ A 1 t( ) and ˆ A 2 t( ) such that 
ρ ˆ A 1 t + Δt( )= ρ ˆ A 2 t( ),                                                                                                        (23) 
then 
V ρ, ˆ A 1 t + Δt( ),P( )= V ρ, ˆ A 2 t( ),P( ),                                                                                  (24) 
where P is an arbitrary payoff function. 
 
I have argued that all of the information available about an arbitrary observable ˆ A 1 t( ) is 
contained in ρ ˆ A 1 t( ) and the physicality principle is a direct consequence of this. 
 
Dominance Let P1 and P2  be payoff functions such that P1 ≥ P2  for all members of the 
spectrum of ˆ A 1 t( ) then 
V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ),P1( )≥ V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ),P2( ).                                                                                         (25) 
 
This amounts to the reasonable assumption that if in every world a player gets a greater 
payoff when he plays game G1 then he does if he plays game G2  then he will prefer to 
play game G1. 
 
Additivity Let P1 and P2  be arbitrary payoff functions, then 
V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ),P1 + P2( )= V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ),P1( )+ V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ),P2( ).                                                         (26) 
 This means that placing one bet whose payoff function is P1 + P2 on a particular physical 
situation (i.e. – a particular instance of ρ and ˆ A 1 t( )) is the same as placing two separate 
bets on the same physical situation whose payoff functions are P1 and P2  respectively. To 
see why this is true consider a game with state ρ, observable ˆ A 1 t( ) and payoff function 
P1. This is equivalent to measuring the observable P1 ˆ A 1 t( )( )  
P1 ˆ A 1 t( )( )= P1 α1a( )
a= 0
N−1∑ ˆ B 1A a t( )                                                                                            (27) 
with the payoff function P0  since these give the same payoff in every branch. Similarly 
for another payoff function P2  measuring P2 ˆ A 1 t( )( ) and getting the payoff P0  is the same 
as measuring ˆ A 1 t( ) and getting payoff P2 . The observables ˆ A 1 t( ), P1 ˆ A 1 t( )( ), P2 ˆ A 1 t( )( ) 
and P1 + P2( ) ˆ A 1 t( )( ) all commute with one another and so records of the results of 
measuring all of these observables do not conflict with one another. So an agent could 
measure P1 ˆ A 1 t( )( ) and P2 ˆ A 1 t( )( ) separately with payoff P0  and receive a payoff 
P1 + P2( ) α1a( ) in the a th branch just as he would if he measured P1 + P2( ) ˆ A 1 t( )( ). 
 
I will now prove the Born rule in four stages, the first three of which concern only the 
value of games played with pure states. All of the games below will consist of a 
measurement of ˆ A 1 0( ) in the state ρ  with payoff function P0  unless otherwise specified. 
 
Stage 1 Equal probabilities I now follow (Wallace, 2003) to prove that decision theory 
agrees with the Born Rule in cases where all results occur with equal probability. To do 
this I consider the game with 
ρ = 1
N
S1A a b 0( )
a,b= 0
N−1∑
ˆ A 1 0( )= α1a
a= 0
N−1∑ ˆ B 1A a 0( )
.                                                                                                      (28) 
From (28) 
ρ ˆ A 1 0( )= 1N α1bS1Aab 0( )a,b= 0
N−1∑ .                                                                                              (29) 
I will now show that the value of this game is the same as the value of another game, 
which has the same value in all branches of the multiverse – the value given by the Born 
rule. Define Pπ  as the payoff function such that Pπ α1a( )= α1π a( ) where π  is a 
permutation of the integers 0...N −1. Let U
π −1
 be the unitary transformation that performs 
the permutation π −1 on the projectors of ˆ A 1 t( ) then 
V ρ, Aˆ1 t( ), Pπ( )= V ρ, α1π a( )Bˆ1 A a 0( )
a=0
N −1∑ , P0⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
= V ρ, α1a Bˆ1A π −1 a( ) 0( )
a=0
N −1∑ , P0⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
= V ρ,U
π −1
Aˆ1 t( )Uπ −1 †, P0( )
= V ρ, Aˆ1 t( ), P0( )
.                                                                 (30) 
The first equality follows from the definitions of Pπ  and P0 . The second and third are 
trivial. The fourth is a consequence of classical act neutrality. 
 
Consider the game that has the payoff function Pππ∑ . From (30) the value of this game 
is 
V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ), Pπ
π
∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = N!V ρ,
ˆ A 1 t( ),P0( )                                                                                (31) 
since there are N  permutations of 0...N −1. The function Pππ∑  assigns the same payoff 
to every branch, that is  
V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ), Pπ
π
∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = N −1( )! α1aa= 0
N−1∑ .                                                                                   (32) 
To see this, consider the j th branch. How often does α1 j  appear in this branch? As many 
times as there are permutations that have the effect α1 j → α1 j ; that is to say it appears 
N −1( )! times. (31) and (32) give 
V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ),P0( )= 1N α1aa= 0
N−1∑                                                                                                  (33) 
This is the result expected from the Born rule. 
 
Stage 2 Unequal but rational probabilities I will now show that in cases where the 
probabilities are unequal but rational, decision theory predicts the same expectation value 
as the Born Rule. Consider the game 
ρ = 1
M
mamb S1A a b 0( )
a,b=0
N −1∑ 1M S2 A c d 0( )c,d =0
M −1∑
Aˆ1 t( )= α1a
a=0
N −1∑ Bˆ1A a t( )
Aˆ2 t( )= α2 e
e=0
M −1∑ Bˆ2 A e t( )
ma
a=0
M −1∑ = M
.                                                                  (34) 
Suppose, further, that the first m1 eigenvalues of ˆ A 2 t( ) are α11, that the next m2 
eigenvalues of ˆ A 2 t( ) are α12  and so on. 
 
I will now show that the value of this game is the same as the value of another game, a 
game in which the probabilities are all equal but which has the value given by the Born 
rule for the unequal but rational probability game. A measurement of the form (21) is 
performed from ˆ A 1 t( ) to ˆ A 2 t( ) at time 0, so that 
ˆ A 1 1( )= α1a
a= 0
N−1∑ ˆ B 1A a 0( )= ˆ A 1 0( )




γ a∑ ˆ B 1A e 0( )
γ j = mk
k= 0
j∑
.                                                                                    (35) 
From (34) and (35) 
ρ ˆ A 1 1( )= ρ ˆ A 1 0( )= 1M mambα1bS1A a b 0( )a,b= 0
N−1∑ 1M S2 A c d 0( )c,d = 0
M −1∑
ρ ˆ A 2 1( )= 1M mamb S1A a b 0( )a,b= 0




.                                         (36) 
And from the properties of the spectrum of ˆ A 2 t( ) the second equation of (36) may be 
rewritten as 
ρ ˆ A 2 1( )= 1M mambα1bS1A a b 0( )a,b= 0
N−1∑ 1M S2 A c d 0( )c,d = 0
M −1∑ = ρ ˆ A 1 0( ).                                         (37) 
It follows from (37) and Physicality that 
V ρ, ˆ A 2 1( ),P0( )= V ρ, ˆ A 1 0( ),P0( ).                                                                                        (38) 
(36) may be rewritten as 
ρ ˆ A 2 1( )= ˆ B 1C c 0( ) 1M α2 eS2 A c e 0( )c,e= 0
M −1∑ ,                                                                               (39) 
where ˆ B 1C c 0( ) is a projector of some observable on S1. And the invariance of S1A a b 0( ) 
operators on H1 under permutations of S2 A a b 0( ) operators, along with (33), (38), (39) 
and the properties of the spectrum of ˆ A 2 t( ) gives 
V ρ, ˆ A 1 0( ),P0( )= maα1aMa= 0
N−1∑ .                                                                                              (40) 
This is the result expected from the Born rule.  
 
Stage 3 Irrational probabilities The value of a game with irrational probabilities 
follows from the result for rational probabilities plus dominance and the denseness of the 
rational numbers in the reals. Explicitly, following (Deutsch, 1999), suppose that ˆ A 1 t( ) at 
time 0 is such that the state ρ sets the probability of some of its eigenvalues to 0 and 
some or all of the probabilities of the eigenvalues are irrational. Suppose that Uupper  is an 
evolution that changes ˆ A 1 t( ) so that an eigenvalue greater than all of the ones that have 
non-zero probability at time 0 has anon-zero rational probability. The value of this game 
is greater than that of the game with ˆ A 1 t( ) and ρ at time zero. The value of the game at 
time 0 sets a lower bound on the value of all games of this form.  
 
Similarly there are transformations Ulower that change ˆ A 1 t( ) so that an eigenvalue less than 
all of the ones that have zero probability at time 0 has a non-zero rational probability. The 
value of the game at time 0 sets an upper bound on the value of all games of this form. 
The values of the Uupper  games are given by the Born rule, as are those of the Ulower 
games. So the Born rule also gives the value of games with irrational probabilities. 
 
Stage 4 Mixed states Mixed states usually arise in the context of an open quantum 
system that is part of a larger system in a pure state. In this case, the probabilistic 
predictions concerning the open subsystem may be derived by using the above argument 
on the larger system of which the open subsystem is a part. But some authors, such as 
Deutsch (1991) and Hawking (1976), have postulated mixed states for the multiverse as a 
whole, so I shall give a direct proof that the Born Rule also works for mixed states: 
 
Stage 4.1 Mixed states and unsharp observables Any mixed state is represented by an 
operator that is mathematically the same as a sum of some set of pure states with real 
coefficients that sum to 1. Suppose that an observable ˆ A 1 t( ) is measured in a mixed state 
and  that the observable is unsharp with respect to each of the pure states in the sum 
representing the mixed state, then the density operator may be expressed in the same 




N∑ ˆ B 1C b 0( )= μb
b=1
N∑ β1C d eS1A d e 0( )
ˆ A 1 0( )= α1a
a=1




.                                                                           (41) 
From (41) 
ρ ˆ A 1 0( )= μb
b= 0
N−1∑ β1bdeα1eS1Ade 0( ).                                                                                          (42) 
From phase indifference and physicality this is the same as a game with any state ′ ρ such 
that 
′ ρ ˆ A 1 0( )= λd eα1eS1A d e 0( )
d ,e=1
N∑
λde = μbβ1b d e
b= 0
N−1∑ <1
.                                                                                           (43) 
From physicality, the value of this game is the same as the value of a game played with a 
suitable pure state and an observable that is unsharp relative to that pure state, which is 
given by the Born Rule as shown in Stages 1-3. Sometimes the state has the same 
projectors as the measured observable and a different argument is needed to cover these 
cases. 
 
Stage 4.2 Equal probabilities I will now show that if an observable ˆ A 1 t( ) is measured in 
a mixed state and  that the observable is sharp with respect to each of the pure states in 
the sum representing the mixed state and that the Born rule states that the probabilities of 
each outcome should be equal then the expected value of the resulting game is given by 
the Born rule. In this game, the observable and state are: 
ρ = 1
N
ˆ B 1A a 0( )
a= 0
N−1∑
ˆ A 1 t( )= α1a ˆ B 1A a 0( )
a= 0
N−1∑
.                                                                                                      (44) 
So all of the information accessible to an agent playing the game is contained in the 
expression: 
ρ ˆ A 1 t( )= 1N α1a ˆ B 1A a 0( )a= 0
N−1∑ .                                                                                                (45) 
The argument given in Stage 1 above obviously works just as well on (45) to give  
V ρ, ˆ A 1 t( ),P0( )= 1N α1aa= 0
N−1∑ ,                                                                                                (46) 
which is the result expected from the Born Rule. 
 
Stage 4.3 Unequal rational probabilities I will now show that if an observable ˆ A 1 t( ) is 
measured in a mixed state and  that the observable is sharp with respect to each of the 
pure states in the sum representing the mixed state and that the Born rule states that the 
probabilities of each outcome should be equal then the expected value of the resulting 
game is given by the Born rule. To derive the value of this game I use the systems with 
the state and observables: 
ρ = ma
M
Bˆ1 A a 0( )
a,b=0
N −1∑ 1M Bˆ2 A b 0( )b=0
M −1∑
Aˆ1 t( )= α1a
a=0
N −1∑ Bˆ1 A a t( )
Aˆ2 t( )= α2 b
b=0
M −1∑ Bˆ2 A b t( )
ma
a=0
M −1∑ = M
.                                                                                (47) 
Suppose, further, that the first m1 eigenvalues of ˆ A 2 t( ) are α11, that the next m2 
eigenvalues of ˆ A 2 t( ) are α12 and so on. 
 
As in Stage 2 I will show that the value of this game is the same as the value of another 
game, a game in which the probabilities are all equal but which has the value given by the 
Born rule for the unequal but rational probability game. From (47) 
ρAˆ1 t( )= α1a maM Bˆ1 A a 0( )a,b= 0
N −1∑ 1M Bˆ2 A b 0( )b=0
M −1∑
ρAˆ2 t( )= maM Bˆ1 A a 0( )a,b=0
N −1∑ α2 b 1M Bˆ2 A b 0( )b=0
M −1∑
                                                                  (48) 
A measurement of the form (21) is performed from ˆ A 1 t( ) to ˆ A 2 t( ) at time 0, so that 
 
öA1 1( )= α1a
a=0
N −1∑ öB1 A a 0( )= öA1 0( )
öA2 1( )= öB1 A a 0( )
a=0
N −1∑ α2 e
e=γ a−1
γ a∑ öB2 Ae 0( )
γ j = mk
k =0
j∑
.                                                                               (49) 
(49), (47) and the properties of the spectrum of ˆ A 2 t( ) give: 
ρ ˆ A 2 1( ) = maM ˆ B 1A a 0( )a,b= 0





α1a ˆ B 1A a 0( )
a,b= 0
N−1∑ 1M ˆ B 2 A b 0( )c,d = 0
M −1∑ = ρ ˆ A 1 0( )
.                                                      (50) 
From (50) 
ρ ˆ A 1 0( )= ρ1 1M α2 b ˆ B 2 A b 0( )c,d = 0
M −1∑ ,                                                                                        (51) 
where ρ1 is a density operator on H1. So permutations of the ˆ B 2Ab 0( ) do not affect ρ1 and 
using physicality the value of the game in (51) is the same as the value of the game 
played by measuring ˆ A 2 t( ) in the state ρ . This argument gives the result: 
V ρ, Aˆ1 t( ), P0( )= maM α1aa=0
N −1∑ .                                                                                            (52) 
 Stage 4.3 Irrational probabilities The argument that gives Born rule for mixed states 
with irrational probabilities follows exactly the same pattern as Stage 3 using the value of 
the games 4.1 - 4.3. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
I have shown that under the many worlds theory, the Born rule correctly predicts the 
decision theoretic probabilities of the outcome of a measurement. I shall now discuss 
some criticisms of the decision theoretic approach to probability in the many world 
theory. Lewis (2005) and Greaves (2004) have pointed out that the many worlds theory 
does not allow the agent to be uncertain about the future given that he knows the initial 
conditions and the equation of motion. Wallace (2006) objects that this makes many 
common sense ideas wrong including the idea that experimenters should be uncertain 
about the outcome of their experiments even if they know the initial conditions and 
equations of motion of a quantum system. However, common sense ideas change over 
time as people come to believe different explanations. For example, at one time people 
regarded the existence of witches as common sense because witches played a role in their 
explanations of their misfortunes and now they do not. So what did uncertainty explain in 
classical decision theory? In classical physics only one world exists and it evolves 
deterministically. It is possible that historically the reason people attached such 
probability to uncertainty was that the only way it could make sense for an agent to refer 
to more than one world in classical physics and to attach weights to them was if the agent 
was ignorant of some relevant feature of the laws of motion or initial conditions. In the 
many worlds theory the agent will experience many futures if the observable measured is 
unsharp relative to the state. The decision theoretic probability derived above shares all of 
the features that are traditionally thought to hold for the decision theoretic probability in 
classical decision theory except uncertainty.  
 
As I mention above the notion of quantum Darwinism I employ only allows for perfect 
correlations not for imperfect correlations. I do this because as soon as imperfect 
correlations are introduced I have to start discussing the probability of getting the right 
answer out of a channel and that would defeat the purpose of writing this paper. After the 
Born rule has been derived using the strict notion of quantum Darwinism employed 
above there is nothing to prevent anyone employing it to study the imperfect, 
probabilistic transmission of information and the degree of classicality of specific 
systems as in (Ollivier et al., 2004 and 2005). 
 
An anonymous referee objected to the decision theoretic view of quantum probability on 
the grounds that the probability does not match the relative frequency. Probabilistic 
statements are tested by assuming that the relative frequency of results is similar to the 
probability although they usually will not match exactly (Popper, 1959, Sections 65-68). 
So if the relative frequency does not match the probability even approximately as will 
happen in some worlds, then perhaps the many worlds decision theoretic approach to 
probability renders probabilistic statements untestable. This objection is wrong. In the 
decision theoretic approach the more times an experiment is repeated, the more probable 
worlds in which the relative frequencies of different results approximately match the 
probability will become. Worlds in which the relative frequencies of different results do 
not approximately match the probability will become less probable. So an agent will be 
more rational to bet that the relative frequency will approximately match the probability 
than to assume that the relative frequency will not match the probability. In some worlds 
the rewards the players will get will not reflect this fact. However, this just means that 
this experiment, like every other, can go wrong, which is already true for a long list of 
other reasons. For example, a scientist can misinterpret experimental results, he can 
misunderstand the physics of the measuring instrument or the measured phenomenon, the 
instrument can fail to perform correctly and so on. There is no reason as to why the 
problem of testing probabilistic statements using relative frequencies makes science 
unviable while all of the other problems do not. I should also note that this problem is not 
unique to the many worlds theory or the decision theoretic approach to that theory. In the 
Copenhagen Interpretation and other collapse theories the state can collapse into a world 
in which relative frequencies don’t match probabilities as predicted by the Born rule even 
approximately. The corpuscles of the pilot wave theory might move into a branch where 
relative frequencies don’t match probabilities as predicted by the Born rule even 
approximately. Hidden variables theories say that quantum physics is just plain false 
because it is only an approximation to a deeper theory and so presumably it is also 
possible for the world described by these theories to deviate from the Born rule. So this 
problem cannot have any relevance for distinguishing the decision theoretic approach to 
the many worlds theory from any other theory. The fact that the Born rule can be derived 
from the many worlds theory using decision theory seems to indicate that it is 
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